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PROCEDURE

against her on this ground. Had the wife been free of fault, a
hiatus in the substantive law of Louisiana would have presented
the court with a serious question as to its authority to grant her
permanent alimony.
Following this decision, the appellate court called this hiatus
in our law to the attention of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
On the recommendation of the latter, the legislature in 1964
amended the Civil Code so as to grant a court the right to award
alimony to a wife free from fault when the "husband obtained
a valid divorce from his wife in a court of another state or
87
country which had no jurisdiction over her person.1

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO LAWFUL ARREST

State v. Pickens1 provides a clear exposition of the rules
governing the scope of the officer's search for weapons and
incriminating evidence incidental to an arrest on reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee has committed a felony. 2 In Pickens
the Supreme Court upheld the search of an automobile in which
burglary suspects were driving at the time of their arrest shortly after the crime. Thus, the stolen money and goods found
were lawfully seized and were properly admissible in evidence
at the subsequent burglary trial. Justice Hamlin stressed the
fact that "in the case of moving vehicles whose drivers may
be carrying contraband or stolen property, and flight and escape
are imminent, probable cause can exist for search without a
warrant, time being of the essence. If the vehicle or automobile
were not searched, apprehension of the criminal would be unnecessarily delayed and perhaps never take place."'3 Upon an examination of the facts and circumstances of the case, it was
87. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 160(3) (1870), as amended, La. Acts 1964, No. 48,
This amendment is discussed in Louisiana Legislation of 1964 Civil Procedure, 25 LA. L. REV. 28, 32 (1964).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577 (1964).
2. LA. R.S. 15:68 (1950).
3. 160 So. 2d at 584.
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apparent that there was "probable cause" for the arrest and
incidental search of the arrestee's automobile.
BASIS OF SEARCH WARRANT

A search warrant may issue only on "probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation," established to the satisfaction
of the judge. 4 In State v. McIlvaine5 the officers had obtained
a warrant to search the defendant's residence "'for the purpose
of seizing the following described property * * * narcotics opium derivatives and synthetic drugs and burglary tools' .
'The above officers received information from a confidential
and reliable source that there is [sic] narcotics and burglary
tools concealed in the premises of 3117 No. Derbigny Street."8
The Louisiana Supreme Court stated that "the question to
be determined is whether the facts and circumstances before
the judge who issued the warrant were sufficient to justify a
man of prudence and caution in believing that an offense had
been or was being committed on the premises described in the
search warrant, even though the officer who made the affidavit
was requesting the warrant upon information received from
another person.' '7 (Emphasis added.) Applying this test to the
case at bar, the court concluded that under the circumstances
of the instant case "it was reasonable for the judge who issued
the warrant to conclude that the narcotics were probably present
at the place named in the warrant, and this is sufficient." In
reaching this conclusion, the court discussed "probable cause,"
and significantly stated: " 'It is not enough that facts subsequently shown would have sufficed to show probable cause.' 9
With this admonition in mind, it would have been better, and
would have removed any doubt about the validity of the search
warrant, if the application for the warrant had included facts
which were shown on a motion to suppress: for example, that
the officers obtaining the warrants knew the defendants through
4. LA. CONST. art. I, § 7. There is an abundance of jurisprudence interpreting
the phrase "probable cause." See State v. Norris, 161 La. 988, 109 So. 787
(1926), dismissed, 274 U.S. 719 (1927) ; State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So.
103 (1917) ; State v. Doremus, 137 La. 266, 68 So. 605 (1913), holding that
what is probable cause in a given case is left largely to the discretion of the
judge issuing the warrant.
5. 245 La. 649, 160 So. 2d 566 (1964).
6. 160 So. 2d at 568.
7. Id. at 569.
8. Id. at 570.
9. Id. at 569.
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,prior dealings with them in prior criminal matters, and that
the source of information upon which the officers acted had
proven reliable in prior cases.
REMISSION OF BAIL FORFEITURE BY GOVERNOR

The Governor has constitutional power to "grant pardons,
commute sentences, and remit fines and forfeitures."' 0 State
v. United Bonding Ins. Co." held that this power does not
authorize the Governor to issue a remittitur of a bail bond forfeiture. Justice Hawthorne, after reviewing the history of the
executive pardoning power, concluded that this power could
only be exercised where there had been an offense against the
state. He then characterized the question for decision as
"whether the forfeiture of bail bond is a forfeiture for an
offense against the State." This question was answered in the
negative by pointing out that the bail bond forfeiture is a civil
proceeding arising out of contract, and that a judgment of
forfeiture creating a debt "is a civil obligation, and cannot possibly be considered as a penalty for an offense against the
State."'1 2 It then logically followed that the Governor's power
to remit criminal fines and forfeitures does not authorize remission of the forfeiture of a bail bond.
CHANGE OF VENUE

The change of venue provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 3 are posited on the idea that the defendant should
not be tried in a parish where there is such prejudice that a
fair trial cannot be had. The defendant's right to a change of
.enue must, however, be urged with reasonable promptness after
14
the local prejudice becomes apparent. In State v. Morris,
a prosecution for murder, the first trial had resulted in a mistrial, and the case was set for trial a month later. On the date
set for the retrial, and after selection of the jury had begun,
the defendant filed a motion for change of venue. This motion
was summarily overruled by the trial judge on the ground that
it had not been "made timely." Article 291 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure simply states: "No change of venue 'shall
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

LA.
244
154
LA.
245

CONST. art. V, § 10.
La. 716, 154 So. 2d 374 (1963).
So. 2d at 377.
R.S. 15:289-301 (1950).
La. 475, 157 So. 2d 728 (1963).
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be awarded until the accused shall have been arraigned and
shall have pleaded 'not guilty'."'15 Defense counsel in Morris
apparently assumed that the motion could be made any time
before the trial had actually commenced. However, the Supreme
Court, relying on the required allegation in applications for
change of venue "that the application has been made as soon
as it could be after the discovery of such prejudice or other
cause, and not for delay,"' 6 upheld the trial court's ruling that
the motion had not been timely made. The adverse publicity of
the defendant's first trial, which was the principal basis of the
defendant's motion, had occurred more than a month before the
date set for the second trial, and no reason was given for delaying the motion until the day of the trial. The timeliness of
a motion for change of venue, which is not clearly spelled out in
the code articles, becomes a matter of reasonableness. It would
be unreasonable to require that the application for a change of
venue be made as a preliminary plea at the arraignment, for
it is prejudice existing at the time of the trial that is to be
guarded against. Conversely, it is reasonable to hold, as the
Louisiana Supreme Court does in State v. Morris, that the defendant cannot delay his application until the day of the trial. 17
CONTINUANCE

It is fundamental due process that defense counsel should
be given such reasonable time as he can show is necessary for
the preparation of his defense, and courts are reluctant to force
a defendant to a criminal trial when he insists he is not ready.
However, motions for a continuance may be for the purpose of
delay, and defense counsel's inability to meet the trial date set
may have resulted from inexcusable procrastination or putting
other things first. Thus article 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure' 8 very properly provides that "the granting or refusing
of any continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial
judge." Upon a proper showing of need for additional time to
prepare the case, the trial judge will usually grant a continuance
even after the date for the trial has been set. When the trial
15. LA. R.S. 15:29 (1950).
16. Id. 15:292.
17. Accord, article 1 of Tentative Title XX, Change of Venue, of the Louisiana State Law Institute projet for a revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that an application for change of venue "may be made . . at least two
days prior to the commencement of trial."
18. LA. R.S. 15:320 (1950).
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judge refuses a continuance his ruling will seldom be reversed.
In State v. Freeman9 there was no special showing that a period
of eleven days was not sufficient for defense counsel to investigate and prepare the defense to a burglary charge, and the
Supreme Court held that the trial judge had not abused his
discretion in refusing to grant a continuance. Even when a
more specific showing is made the trial judge's ruling will sel20
dom be reversed.
TIME FOR CHARGE TO JURY

The order of procedure in the trial is clearly set out in
article 333 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2' Under this
article the judge is to give his charge to the jury after the argument of counsel. In State v. Brown 22 defense counsel had requested the court to charge the jury before any evidence was
adduced, relying upon the language of article 38923 which proVides: "The judge shall deliver his charge in writing, whenever
requested to do so either by the prosecution or the defense prior
to the swearing of the first witness." In upholding the trial
judge's refusal to charge the jury at the time requested, the
Supreme Court pointed out that the time for charging the jury
is prescribed by article 333. The proper application and interrelation of articles 333 and 389 is succinctly and clearly stated
by Justice Hawthorne, writing for a unanimous court, when
he states: "Article 389 sets the time for counsel to request the
judge to give the charge in writing, and article 333 fixes the
time for the judge to deliver the charge (whether oral or

written) .",24
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS

It is well settled that the Supreme Court will not review alleged erroneous rulings of the judge or other trial irregularities
unless the defendant has objected at the time and has reserved
and perfected a bill of exceptions to the ruling or irregularity
* 19. 245 La. 665, 160 So. 2d 571 (1964).
20. In State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 228, 198 So. 910, 913 (1940), the Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant a continuance where the
defendant's motion was based upon the fact that counsel was confronted with
other pressing civil cases and was slowed up in the preparation of the defense by
their inexperience in criminal law.

21.
22.
23.
24.

LA.
245
LA.
157

R.S. 15:333 (1950).
La. 112, 157 So. 2d 459 (1963).
R.S. 15:389 (1950).
So. 2d at 460.
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complained of. 25 This requirement was applied in' State 'v.

Ford,26 although the entire testimony was attached to and incorporated in a motion for a new trial which had been denied. In
so holding the court pointed out that evidence is not a part of
;the record " 'unless it is appended to and made part of a perfected bill of exceptions.' "27
It is sacramental that bills of exceptions must be signed by
the trial judge before the appeal is taken. 28 Thus State v. Robin.son29 held that unsigned bills are treated as abandoned and will
not be considered by the Supreme Court. State v. Brown"0 held
that bills of exceptions are abandoned when the defendant does
not appear or file a brief with the Supreme Court.
APPEALS

The Louisiana Supreme Court's general appellate jurisdiction over misdemeanor convictions is dependent upon the penalty actually imposed, namely, whether a fine exceeding three
hundred dollars or imprisonment of over six months is imposed. 31 The 1958 revision of appellate jurisdiction, which. became effective on July 1, 1960, logically applied the same ap'peals formula to criminal prosecutions of adults in juvenile
courts.3

2

Thus, in State v. Maricle33 a defendant who had been

convicted in juvenile court of the misdemeanor of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor, and sentenced to ten days imprisonment and a fine of fifty dollars plus costs, had no right
of appeal. In dismissing the defendant's appeal the' Supreme
Court allowed two weeks to apply for supervisory writs, since
the defendant may apply for review by discretionary writs in
non-appealable cases.'
25. LA. R.S. 15:510 (1950).
26. 245 La. 490, 159 So. 2d 129 (1963).
27. 159 So. 2d at 131.
28. LA. R.S. 15:542, 545 (1950).
29. 245 La. 116, 157 So.2d 461 (1963).
30. 245 La. 442, 158 So. 2d 605 (1963) ; accord, State v. Wessinger, 245 La.
409, 158 So.2d 594 (1963).
31. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
;32. Id. §§ 52, 96.
33. 245 La. 439, 158 So. 2d 604 (1963) accord, State v. Thomas, 245 La.
444, 158 So.2d 606 (1963).

